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Steven Pinker proposes a game-theoretic framework to help explain the 
use of veiled speech in contexts where the ultimate aims of the speaker 
and hearer may diverge—such as cases of bribing a police offi cer to get 
out of a ticket and paying a maître d’ to get a table. This is presented 
as a response to what Pinker sees as the failure in H. P. Grice’s infl u-
ential theory of meaning to recognize that speakers and hearers are not 
always cooperating. In this paper I argue that Pinker mischaracterizes 
Grice’s views on cooperation, and use this to refi ne a positive picture of 
what sort of cooperation is demanded by Grice’s Cooperative Principle. 
This positive picture serves to insulate the Gricean framework from ob-
jectors—including Pinker—who overstate the obligations entailed by the 
adoption of the Cooperative Principle. I then argue that the cases Pinker 
presents are best treated by recognizing that in each instance the utter-
ance is formulated with two intentions towards two different audiences 
and detail a resulting revision to Pinker’s game-theoretic framework 
that refl ects this proposal. I conclude by demonstrating how this pro-
posed game-theoretic framework of cooperation with multiple audiences 
can be used to model the costs and benefi ts of other types of discourse, 
including political speech.
Keywords: Grice, cooperation, cooperative principle, multiple audi-
ences, Pinker, game theory.
Introduction
Philosopher of language H. P. Grice is well known for his theory of 
speaker meaning, which is grounded in his Cooperative Principle and 
four maxims of conversation. Grice’s work has infl uenced much cur-
rent work in philosophy of language, linguistics, philosophy of law, 
evolutionary psychology, and many other areas. There is one area of 
Grice’s program, however, that is frequently criticized: his Cooperative 
Principle. This principle is attacked by theorists across a wide range of 
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disciplines who point to the numerous ways in which certain communi-
cative interactions are not cooperative1 (Marmor 2011; Godfrey-Smith 
and Martínez 2013; Pinker 2007a; Pinker 2007b, 2011; Pinker, Nowak, 
and Lee 2008; Lee and Pinker 2010). However, as I will argue in this 
essay, Grice’s Cooperative Principle is not as demanding as some have 
thought. Many interactions where the interlocutors have divergent ul-
timate aims are cooperative in the sense relevant to Grice’s theory of 
meaning.
Perhaps the most robust and sustained objections to Grice on these 
grounds have been waged by psychologist Steven Pinker. In recent 
work, Steven Pinker (2007a, 2007b, 2011); Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 
2008; Lee and Pinker 2010) has proposed a game-theoretic framework 
to help explain the use of implicature in contexts where the ultimate 
aims of the speaker and hearer may diverge. Pinker proposes that in 
such contexts implicature can be used as a way to avoid a number of 
social and fi nancial costs by discussing examples—such as bribing a 
police offi cer to get out of a ticket and paying a maître d’ to get a table—
and provides a game-theoretic framework that is meant to model these 
costs and benefi ts. This is presented as a response to what Pinker sees 
as Grice’s failure to recognize that speakers and hearers are not always 
cooperating.
In this paper I will argue that Pinker seriously mischaracterizes 
Grice’s views on cooperation (see also Terkourafi  2011a; 2011b; Reboul 
Forthcoming a; Forthcoming b). In the course of doing so, I refi ne a 
positive notion of the sort of cooperation that is demanded by Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle. Although I make Pinker my target, this posi-
tive notion could be used to dispel similar objections to Grice made by 
other theorists as well. I then argue that the cases Pinker presents are 
best treated by recognizing that in each instance the utterance was 
formulated with two different audiences in mind (See also Grice 1989: 
37 and Neale 1999: 29-30 for discussion of multiple audiences): 1) the 
immediate audience, and 2) a future potential audience. The apparent 
obscurity arises because there is a clash between the intended commu-
nicated content with respect to these different audiences.
H. P. Grice
In works such as “Meaning”, “Logic and Conversation”, “Utterer’s 
Meaning and Intention” (Grice 1989), Grice presents a theory of speak-
1 Andrei Marmor writes “The standard model in the pragmatics literature 
focuses on ordinary conversations, in which the parties are presumed to engage in a 
cooperative exchange of information” (Marmor 2011: 83) but that “the enactment of a 
law is not a cooperative exchange of information” (Marmor 2011: 96). Peter Godfrey-
Smith and Manolo Martínez write “Many theorists have seen communication as 
a fundamentally cooperative phenomenon. In an evolutionary context, however, 
cooperation cannot be taken for granted, because of problems of subversion and free-
riding” (Godfrey-Smith and Martínez 2013: 1).
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er meaning. Speaker meaning captures how a speaker can write some-
thing such as “Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his atten-
dance at tutorials has been regular” in a letter of recommendation and 
thereby mean “Mr. X is no good at philosophy” (Grice 1989: 33).
In this discussion Grice presents his Cooperative Principle. The Co-
operative Principle states that conversational partners will make their 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange (29). 
This is a “quazi-contractual matter” (29). Further, Grice writes that 
“On the assumption that some such general principle as this is accept-
able, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another 
of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Coopera-
tive Principle” (26). These are his four conversational maxims of quan-
tity, quality, relation, and manner. The maxim of quantity states 
 “1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange) and
 2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is re-
quired” (26). 
The maxim of quality states 
 “Supermaxim: try to make your contribution one that is true.
 1) Do not say what you believe to be false, and
 2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence” (27).
The maxim of relation states 
 “1) Be relevant” (27).
The maxim of manner states 
 “Supermaxim: be perspicuous (clearly expressed or presented, lucid).
 1) Avoid obscurity of expression, 
 2) Avoid ambiguity, 
 3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity), and 
 4) Be orderly” (27).
To understand what Grice was up to with his maxims of conversation 
we must pay attention to an important distinction between metaphysi-
cal ‘determination’ of meaning and epistemological ‘determination’ of 
meaning (Neale Forthcoming). That is, metaphysical determination 
of meaning is what makes it the case that some speaker’s utterance 
has some meaning, and epistemological determination of meaning is 
the inferential processes hearers go through to work out that meaning 
(Neale Forthcoming). This is a fundamental point about the roles and 
aims of inquiries into meaning. Grice’s theory of meaning is a theory 
of what metaphysically determines meaning; other theorists, such as 
Sperber and Wilson, are engaged in a project of developing a theory 
of the epistemological determination of meaning (Neale Forthcoming). 
This distinction allows us to clearly situate Grice’s project and helps to 
explain certain features of his theory.
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Grice’s ideas are some of the most enduring in philosophy of lan-
guage and have been accepted by many linguists and psychologists. 
His work has also been the subject of much debate and criticism. One 
source of criticism is of Grice's theory is the Cooperative Principle and 
the demands this principle places on interlocutors.
Steven Pinker
One such critic is psychologist Steven Pinker. In his 2007 book The 
Stuff of Thought and later papers in 2008, 2010, and 2011 Pinker pro-
poses a number of instances of perceived non-cooperation as problem 
cases for Grice and his Cooperative Principle. These are sketched out 
in The Stuff of Thought and spelled out in mathematical detail (Pinker, 
Nowak, and Lee 2008) and experimental results (Lee and Pinker 2010) 
in later papers.
In setting up his argument against Grice in The Stuff of Thought, 
Pinker writes,
We’ll begin with a famous theory from the philosophy of language that tries 
to ground indirect speech in pure rationality—the demands of effi cient com-
munication between two cooperating agents. This Spock-like theory will 
then be enhanced by a dose of social psychology, which reminds us that 
people don’t just exchange data like modems. (Pinker 2007a: 375)
In a paper published the following year Pinker and his coauthors write,
Existing theories of indirect speech are based on the premise that human 
conversation partners work together toward a common goal—the effi cient 
exchange of information, in the infl uential theory of H. P. Grice (5) … Yet a 
fundamental insight from evolutionary biology is that most social relation-
ships involve combinations of cooperation and confl ict. (Pinker, Nowak, and 
Lee 2008: 833)
He further presents his proposal in opposition to Grice writing,
Our theory of the Strategic Speaker supplements the traditional approaches 
with the insight from evolutionary psychology that most social interaction 
involves mixtures of cooperation and confl ict rather than pure cooperation. 
(Pinker 2011: 2866) 
Pinker continues this characterization with,
Grice came to conversation from the bloodless world of logic and said lit-
tle about why people bother to implicate their meanings rather than just 
blurting them out. We discover the answer when we remember that people 
are not just in the business of downloading information into each other’s 
heads… (Pinker 2007a: 379)
Pinker's criticism against Grice has grown into a sustained attack 
ranging across a wide body of work.
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Pinker goes on to propose a number of instances of perceived non-
cooperation as problem cases for Grice and his Cooperative Principle. 
The fi rst is a case of bribing a maître d’. We are to imagine that some-
one wants a table in a busy restaurant. This person says something 
like “Is there any way you could speed up my wait?” while handing the 
maître d’ $20 intending to implicate a bribe. Pinker has us consider the 
question, “What are the benefi ts of implicating the bribe rather than 
stating it literally?” The second case is of bribing a police offi cer. We 
are to imagine that someone gets pulled over for speeding. This person 
says something like “Can’t we settle this here?” intending to implicate 
a bribe. Again, we are to consider, “What are the benefi ts of implicating 
the bribe rather than stating it literally?”
Pinker ties these cases to what he sees as the problem for Grice, 
writing that the police bribe case,
… is inconsistent with the traditional idea that indirect speech is an imple-
mentation of pure cooperation: The driver here is using indirect speech not 
to help the honest offi cer attain that goal (viz. to enforce the law) but rather 
to confound that goal. (Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 2008: 834)
It is important to note that with these examples Pinker does not take 
himself to be presenting an analysis of bribing per se but uses these 
bribing cases as an instance of perceived non-cooperation—his true tar-
get. As such, my treatment of Pinker’s cases here is not meant to be a 
treatment of these cases qua instances of bribing, but qua instances of 
perceived non-cooperation.
Pinker writes that “any scenario like that in which the best course 
of action depends on the choices of another actor is in the province 
of game theory” (2007a: 393) and presents game-theoretic frameworks 
such as the one below to show these costs and benefi ts:
Honest Offi  cer Dishonest Offi  cer
Don’t bribe Ticket Ticket
Bribe Arrest for bribe Pay bribe; go free
Honest Offi  cer Dishonest Offi  cer
Don’t bribe Ticket Ticket
Bribe Arrest for bribe Pay bribe; go free
Implicate bribe Ticket Pay bribe; go free
The fi rst matrix displays the options that are available to the speaker 
if implicature is not on the table.2 In the fi rst matrix if the speaker has 
2 Strangely, Pinker characterizes this fi rst matrix as being what an agent acting 
in a “perfect” Gricean way, Maxim Man, would be faced with. This is a further 
serious mischaracterization of Grice that evinces Pinker’s inadequate grasp of his 
theory—but which I will not go into in detail on here beyond this footnote. Pinker 
writes, “Consider a perfect Gricean speaker who says exactly what he means when 
he says anything at all. Maxim Man is pulled over for running a red light and is 
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an honest offi cer the best option is to pay the ticket; if the speaker has 
a dishonest offi cer the best option is to pay the bribe and go free. The 
second matrix shows the options available if implicature is on the table. 
Note that in the implicature row of the second matrix the speaker has 
the options of either paying the ticket, the best option if he has an hon-
est offi cer, or paying the bribe and going free, the best option if he has 
a dishonest offi cer. On Pinker’s framework, the speaker, in implicating 
the bribe, has as the possible outcomes the two best results given some 
offi cer.
Further, Pinker writes that for the second matrix to obtain, it must 
be the case that the speaker “knows that the offi cer can work through 
the implicature and recognize it as an intended bribe, and he also 
knows that the offi cer knows that he couldn’t make a bribery charge 
stick in court because the ambiguous wording would prevent a pros-
ecutor from proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” (2007a: 394). 
This is a lot of knowledge for someone to have about a police offi cer he 
just met, especially considering that at the same time the speaker is 
not supposed to know whether the offi cer is honest or dishonest.
In such sections of The Stuff of Thought and later work building off 
these cases (2007a; 2007b; 2011; Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 2008; Lee 
and Pinker 2010) Pinker advances the following implicit argument.
1. Veiled speech is ineffi cient.
2. Because veiled speech is ineffi cient it is uncooperative.
3. Grice only considers communication that occurs in contexts of 
pure cooperation, as given by his “Cooperative Principle”.
4. Therefore, veiled speech cannot be accounted for by Grice, and 
we need Pinker's account instead.
In what follows I will argue that Pinker’s premises 2 and 3 are both 
false, beginning with premise 3. This has the result that his argument 
is not sound, and we do not have support for the conclusion.
pondering whether to bribe the offi cer. Since he obeys the maxims of conversation 
more assiduously than he obeys the laws of traffi c or the laws of bribery, the only 
way he can bribe the offi cer is by saying, ‘If you let me go without a ticket, I’ll pay you 
fi fty dollars’” (Pinker 2007a: 393; See also Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 2008: 834 for this 
characterization again). The contrasts between this bizarre characterization of Grice 
and what his theory actually consists of will become apparent when I discuss the 
ways the maxims can be weighed against the others and in my positive proposal in 
later sections. To describe Grice’s theory as one that does not allow for conversational 
implicatures demonstrates a misunderstanding of the most fundamental kind.
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Third Premise: Pinker and Grice 
on the Cooperative Principle
Let me begin with my argument that Pinker’s third premise is false. 
That is, I will now argue that it is not true that Grice only considers 
communication that occurs in contexts of pure cooperation, as given by 
his Cooperative Principle.
As noted in the previous section, Pinker contrasts his view with 
Grice’s by saying that Grice’s theory of conversation is “based on the 
premise that human conversation partners work together toward a 
common goal—the effi cient exchange of information” (Pinker, Nowak, 
and Lee 2008: 833). Pinker characterizes Grice’s view as relying on 
“pure cooperation” (Pinker 2011: 2866; Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 2008: 
833) and writes that Grice overlooks the fact that most interactions in-
volve both cooperation and confl ict. He writes that “in trying to deduce 
the laws of conversation from a ‘Cooperative Principle’” (note the use of 
scare quotes) Grice is “guilty” of assuming “the speaker and the hearer 
are working in perfect harmony” (Pinker 2007a: 392).
However, contrary to the way Pinker presents him, Grice does not 
demand full cooperation. What Grice actually says about cooperation 
is the following,
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected 
remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, 
to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes 
in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a 
mutually accepted direction…at each stage, some possible conversational 
moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. (26)
We see in this section that there are a number of places where Grice 
hedges or qualifi es his position on cooperation in some way, using words 
and phrases such as “do not normally”, “characteristically”, “to some 
degree”, “at least”, “to some extent”, “or at least”, and “some…would be 
excluded”. Grice is not making a sweeping claim that all conversation 
exchanges are always fully cooperative, but is making the tentative 
claim that they characteristically involve some degree of cooperation.
Grice goes on to be quite clear about what features a conversation 
must have to be cooperative3 on his view, paraphrased here.
3 It should be noted that Grice is not making a claim about the sort of cooperation 
that must have been required for language to have begun in homo sapiens as a 
species or with respect to particular human populations. Grice’s arguments are 
made within a culture where we already have both the cognitive requirements 
for language use in general and a system where particular languages exist. There 
certainly are interesting questions to be asked about the sort of cooperation required 
for the cognitive capacity for language to evolve and be selected for, and for language 
use to be a sustainable system in a species (Dawkins and Krebs 1978; Sterelny 2003: 
Papineau 2005; Dessalles 2007; Tomasello 2010), but we can pull such questions 
apart from what I consider here.
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Characteristic features that jointly distinguish cooperative trans-
actions:4
1. Have some common immediate aim 
2. Contributions of participants are mutually dependent
3. The transaction will continue until it reaches its natural terminus 
  (the interlocutors will not just walk away in the middle of the 
  conversation) (29)
Grice further elaborates on what he means by this requirement that 
interlocutors have some “common immediate aim”. He writes, “The 
participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car 
mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even 
in confl ict—each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, 
leaving the other stranded” (Grice 1989: 29; see also 30). We see here 
that Grice explicitly allows for cases where the ultimate aims of conver-
sational participants are in opposition.
With Grice’s specifi c claims at hand let us refl ect on one of the cases 
Pinker presented. Recall that Pinker wrote,
[the police bribe case] … is inconsistent with the traditional idea that in-
direct speech is an implementation of pure cooperation: The driver here is 
using indirect speech not to help the honest offi cer attain that goal (viz. to 
enforce the law) but rather to confound that goal. (Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 
2008: 834)
However, someone who does not want the offi cer to enforce the law as 
in Pinker’s police bribe example can still be cooperative with respect to 
the conversation.
We could say the speaker is being “Communicatively Cooperative” 
although not “Ultimately Cooperative”,5 understanding these two no-
tions in the following way:
Communicative Cooperation
Demanded by Grice’s Cooperative Principle
1. Speakers abide by Grice’s maxims of conversation of quality,
   quantity, relation, and manner in formulating their utterances.
2. The conversational participants have enough immediate aims in 
  common that they will not abandon the conversation altogether.
4 Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson argue that the notion of cooperation demanded 
by Relevance Theory is weaker than what is demanded by Grice. They write “…
Grice assumes that communication involves a greater degree of cooperation than we 
do. For us, the only purpose that a genuine communicator and a willing audience 
necessarily have in common is to achieve uptake: that is, to have the communicator’s 
informative intention recognized by the audience” (1989: 161). Although, it is not 
clear what this difference really amounts to, and how some set of interlocutors 
could share the desire that the audience recognize the communicator’s informative 
intention if they did not have even a minimal common purpose.
5 I will henceforth capitalize these terms to show I am using them in a technical 
way according to the defi nitions I provide here.
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Ultimate Cooperation
Not Demanded by Grice’s Cooperative Principle 
1. Shared desire for some outcome with respect to the conversation, 
  overall interaction, or some further long-term aim.
Having these two notions at hand can help to streamline discussion of 
cooperation and communication.
It becomes clear, for one thing, that participants often satisfy the 
requirements of Communicative Cooperation although they have di-
vergent ultimate aims. Arguments, for one—which are certainly unco-
operative in some sense—are very often Communicatively Cooperative 
according to the conditions just provided. Consider the following argu-
ment, between two participants, 1 and 2,
1: You never put the forks in the right place.
2: Well I think it’s stupid to separate the salad forks from the 
  dinner forks.
1: Just because you don’t know the difference between a salad fork 
  and a dinner fork doesn’t mean I should have to live like a 
  heathen!
2: A heathen? You’re the one who leaves towels on the fl oor!
1: When’s the last time I left a towel on the fl oor?
Notice that this conversation is closely in accordance with Grice’s Max-
ims of Conversation. Specifi cally,
a) Each reply is directly in response to the previous comment 
  (Maxim of Relation6).
b) They are consistent in tone (Maxim of Manner).
c) Each participant is expected to only say things that are true 
  and are challenged if not (Maxim of Quality). And,
d) Each retort is about the same length (Maxim of Quantity).
This means all the maxims of conversation were abided by. At the same 
time, neither conversational participant abandoned the exchange. 
Thus, according to the conditions laid out, this is a clear example of 
Communicative Cooperation.
This example would still be a clear example of Communicative Coop-
eration even if each person were trying to achieve any of the following 
ultimate aims: a) make the other feel insecure, b) drive them to madness 
c) have the silverware drawer sorted so that they have easy access to the 
knife they plan to use to kill the other, and so on. None of these ultimate 
aims affects the fact that the dialogue is Communicatively Cooperative.
6 As David Lumsden insightfully points out, there may be an important connection 
between what he calls the “extra-linguistic goals” and the “linguistic goals” insofar 
as the interlocutors’ ideas about what the further aim of the conversation is could 
shape what counts as relevant to the conversation, as in Grice’s petrol case. At the 
same time, there is not always this interplay between the two, as he also renognizes 
(Lumsden 2008: 1901).
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The silverware drawer argument example just discussed is one that 
may at fi rst seem to not be cooperative in the sense demanded by Grice, 
but in fact is, as becomes evident with a clearly defi ned distinction be-
tween Communicative Cooperation and Ultimate Cooperation.
In making his arguments against Grice Pinker confl ates Ultimate 
Cooperation with Communicative Cooperation. The cases Pinker’s 
presents as counterexamples do not, in fact, present a problem for 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle. And neither would other arguments that 
confl ate Ultimate Cooperation with Communicative Cooperation.
Thus, we are now in a position to return to Pinker’s implicit argument.
1. Veiled speech is ineffi cient.
2. Because veiled speech is ineffi cient it is uncooperative.
3. Grice only considers communication that occurs in contexts of 
  pure cooperation, as given by his “Cooperative Principle”.
4. Therefore, veiled speech cannot be accounted for by Grice, and 
  we need Pinker instead.
I have argued here that the third premise—that Grice only considers 
communication that occurs in contexts of pure cooperation, as given by 
his Cooperative Principle—is false.
Failing to be Communicatively Cooperative
With the silverware argument example above I presented a case that 
might at fi rst appear to be not cooperative in the relevant sense for 
Grice, but which, upon defi ning Communicative Cooperation technical-
ly, clearly is. This might raise the further question, “What, then, does 
it take for some utterance to fail to be Communicatively Cooperative?” 
This might raise the further, related question, “Is every utterance that 
appears to violate a maxim a case of the speaker failing to be Com-
municatively Cooperative?” The answer to this second question is ‘no’. 
A maxim of conversation may appear to be violated in cases of impli-
cature. This is central to Grice’s theory of conversation. The fact that a 
maxim appears to have been violated at the level of what the speaker 
said is what tips off hearers that the speaker may be implicating some-
thing at the level of what the speaker meant7 (1989: 33; Neale 1992).
There are three types of implicature in Grice’s theory:
1) Group A—those in which no maxim is violated, or at least in 
  which it is not clear that any maxim is violated.
2) Group B—those in which a maxim is violated, but its violation 
  is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with another 
  maxim.
3) Group C—those in which a maxim is fl outed, or exploited. 
It is clear that Grice recognizes that if one fails to uphold a maxim it 
7 For more details on what the speaker said, or made as if to say, and what the 
speaker meant see Grice (1989: 33–34) and Neale (1992: 13–16).
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may be justifi ed (because of a clash with another maxim as in Group B 
or because a maxim is fl outed as in Group C).
A speaker who makes a Group B or Group C implicature does so 
by abiding by the Cooperative Principle. Such cases are not counter-
examples to Grice but features of his theory. If the speaker appears to 
fail to uphold a maxim and it is not a Group B or Group C implicature, 
this may mean 1) the speaker is misleading the hearer with an unos-
tentatious violation—which includes behavior such as lying, or 2) the 
speaker is opting out of the conversation. This can be understood ac-
cording to the following chart:
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1. Clash Faced by a clash 
– cannot uphold one maxim 
without viola  ng another
Par  cipa  ng or Not 
Par  cipa  ng in a 
Coopera  ve Transac  on
Type of Conversa  onal 
Implicature
A Speaker Appears to Fail 

































3. Violate a Maxim Quietly 
and unostenta  ously 
violate a maxim – will be 
able to mislead
4. Opt Out from the 
opera  on of the maxims 
and the CP – unwilling to 
cooperate
If the speaker seems to have 
violated one of the maxims, 
hearer will work out that a 
par  cular conversa  onal 
implicature is present by 
relying on: (1) conven  onal 
meaning of the words (2) the 
Coopera  ve Principle and 
Maxims (3) context of the 
u  erance (4) other back-
ground knowledge (5) fact that 
(1-4) are available to both
GROUP B: Examples in which a maxim 
is violated, but its viola  on is to be 
explained by the supposi  on of a 
clash with another maxim
 A: Where does C live?
 B: Somewhere in the South 
of France
B’s answer is less informa  ve than is 
required to meet A’s needs. Infringe-
ment of the Maxim of Quan  ty can 
be explained by the supposi  on that 
B is aware that to be more informa-
 ve would be to say something that 
infringed on the Maxim of Quality. B 
implicates that he does not know in 
which town C lives.
2. Flout a maxim – blatant 
failure to fulfi ll - this 
situa  on is one that 
characteris  cally gives rise 
to a conversa  onal 
implicature; a maxim is 
being exploited
GROUP C: Examples that involve 
exploita  on, that is, a procedure by 
which a maxim is fl outed for the 
purpose of ge   ng in a conversa  onal 
implicature by means of something of 
the nature of a fi gure of speech
 A: How o  en do you color?
 B: I can’t color enough
The hearer is en  tled to assume that 
the maxim, or at least the overall 
Coopera  ve Principle, is observed at 
the level of what is implicated.
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A quiet and unostentatious violation of a maxim is a case where 
the speaker is not being Communicatively Cooperative, but hopes the 
hearer will proceed as though the speaker is. The speaker formulates 
utterances with an audience that takes the speaker to be acting in a 
Communicatively Cooperative way. As Grice notes this can lead to 
manipulation of the hearer. Lying is one such form of manipulation 
achieved this way.
Opting out occurs when two potential participants in a talk ex-
change do not have a common immediate aim, and, in fact, may have 
immediate aims that are in confl ict. For instance, imagine the follow-
ing three scenarios. You 1) receive a letter in the mail that says “Action 
Required: Important Survey for Residents”. You then notice the return 
address says it is from People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. 
You’ll not open it. You see PETA is trying to get you to open their mail 
by deceptive means and opt out, tossing the unopened envelope in the 
recycling. 2) A woman is walking down the street on her way to a date. 
A man sitting near the sidewalk says, “God damn”. She will not reply 
or make eye contact. She opts out of the exchange. 3) You are walking 
by the Empire State Building on a visit to CUNY for a conference, try-
ing to get to Starbucks on 33rd Street and back to 34th Street before 
the next talk starts. A man in a red vest carrying pamphlets about the 
Empire State asks you, “Going up?” You do not want to go to the top of 
the Empire State Building. You will not reply. Grice recognizes these 
uncooperative possibilities.
But, in any given case, before we can conclude that an apparently 
violated maxim means the speaker is being uncooperative, we must 
make sure the violation does not result from an implicature of the 
Group B or Group C kind.
With these cases in mind, we can now make a necessary fi nal addi-
tion to our understanding of Communicative Cooperation.
Communicative Cooperation
Demanded by Grice’s Cooperative Principle
1. Speakers abide by Grice’s maxims of conversation in formulat-
ing their utterances.
2. The conversational participants have enough immediate aims in 
common that they will not abandon the conversation altogether.
3. If one appears to fail to uphold a maxim it is justifi ed within 
Grice's theory of implicature—e.g. because of a clash with an-
other maxim as detailed in the chart on the previous page.
Ultimate Cooperation
Not Demanded by Grice’s Cooperative Principle
1. Shared desire for some outcome with respect to the conversa-
tion, overall interaction, or some further long-term aim.
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Second Premise: Veiled Speech is Uncooperative
Equipped, now, with a clearer picture of Grice’s theory, and what is 
demanded by his Cooperative Principle, we can return to Pinker’s im-
plicit argument. I will now argue that the second premise is false.
Pinker’s Argument
1. Veiled speech is ineffi cient.
2. Because veiled speech is ineffi cient it is uncooperative.
3. Grice only considers communication that occurs in contexts of 
pure cooperation, as given by his “Cooperative Principle”.
4. Therefore, veiled speech cannot be accounted for by Grice, and 
we need Pinker's account instead.
In moving toward showing Pinker’s second premise to be false we can 
next ask, “Are there any circumstances in which a speaker can be in-
tentionally obscure while still being Communicatively Cooperative?”
In the section where Grice details a number of Group C implica-
tures he considers a case of apparent obscurity that arises as a result 
of the presence of a third party. He writes, 
Obviously if the Cooperative Principle is to operate I must intend my part-
ner to understand what I am saying despite the obscurity I impart into my 
utterance. Suppose that A and B are having a conversation in the presence 
of a third party, for example, a child, then A might be deliberately obscure, 
though not too obscure, in the hope that B would understand and the third 
party not. (Grice 1989: 37)
For illustration of such a scenario, we can consider a scene from a fi ction 
(King 2008), which Grice seems to have anticipated almost exactly. In 
this scene, four women—Miranda, Carrie, Charlotte, and Samantha—
are meeting for brunch. Charlotte has brought along her young daugh-
ter, Lily. Carrie and Lily are coloring at the table.
 Miranda: How often do you guys have sex?
 Lily: Sex!
 Charlotte: Miranda, please! (Points to her daughter, Lily) 
 Miranda: What? She’s 3! She doesn’t know what it means. I’m 41 
and I still don’t know what it means.
 Charlotte: I know, but she is repeating everything. 
 Samantha: If I had known that girl talk was going to be on lock-
down I wouldn’t have fl own 3,000 miles. 
 Charlotte: No, we can talk. Let’s just not use the word. 
 Miranda: Fine. How often do you guys …
 Carrie: (looks up from coloring) … color? 
 Charlotte: Thank you! 
 Samantha: Well, I can’t color enough. I could color all day, every 
day, if I had my way. I would use every crayon in my box.
 Carrie: We get it. You love to color. (Turns to Miranda.) Why are 
you asking? (King 2008)
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We see in this example exactly the sort of case Grice mentions as a hy-
pothetical. In this interaction there is intentional and careful obscurity 
used in the conversation in the form of the adoption of a new word in 
place of an ordinary word, and we see novel, metaphorical riffs off the 
new word by Samantha. The speakers in this conversation are being 
intentionally obscure in the hopes that the other women at the table 
will understand their meaning and the child will not.
Note that, at the same time, the substitute phrase Carrie comes up 
with is one that would not stand out to the child as being something that 
would be strange for people to discuss. If, on the other hand, Carrie had 
suggested that they discuss “how often they have noodles for arms” even 
the child would likely pick up on this as being strange and ask what they 
are talking about. Also, we see in Samantha’s objection, a reason why 
the topic is not abandoned altogether for a time when the child is absent.
Of course, there are many techniques a speaker might employ if 
she has an utterance she wishes only one person to hear. She may 
meet with some audience alone. She may attempt to make her utter-
ance known to only one audience member by manipulating acoustic 
means—that is, by whispering. However, whispering is recognized as 
behavior one engages when excluding some potential audience member 
who otherwise would hear, and, thus, if done the presence of company 
who feels entitled to be included, will not be used for reasons of po-
liteness. A speaker could switch to a language one hearer knows and 
another does not. Although this can, again, be seen as rude and may be 
objected to by the excluded hearer. Thus, in the presence of audience 
members who for social reasons feel they should not be ostentatiously 
excluded from the conversation by means such as whispering, switch-
ing language, or asking to speak to someone alone, obscurity remains 
one of the least socially costly options for excluding some audience.
For Grice, a speaker can be intentionally obscure while still being 
Communicatively Cooperative in cases where there are two audiences 
the speaker has in mind. The speaker uses veiled or obscure wording 
so that one audience will understand the meaning of the utterance and 
the other will not. In the case of the child overhearing an adult con-
versation it is her presence that explains the use of veiled speech. The 
speaker is cooperating with the adult listeners insofar as the speaker 
works to ensure they can still understand what she means by the veiled 
speech. Such use of veiled speech requires formulating an utterance 
that will be understood by one audience but not the other.
This gap in interpretive understanding is to be explained by dif-
ferences in background knowledge and interpretive tendencies of the 
hearers, which was gauged by the speaker. In the “coloring” example, if 
the speaker incorrectly gauges the background knowledge of her audi-
ence she may: 1) produce an utterance that the child understands and/
or 2) produce an utterance that the adults do not understand.
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Alternative Game-Theoretic Framework
So, we see that for Grice apparent obscurity can sometimes be ex-
plained in terms of a speaker wishing to be understood by one audience 
in terms of the literal content of their utterance and by the second audi-
ence in terms of the implicated content of their utterance. In the police 
bribe scenario Pinker has it be the case that the speaker implicates a 
bribe so that there is less chance he will get arrested. However, if the 
speaker properly implicated the bribe (taking into account the inter-
pretive capacities of the hearer), there would be no lack of clarity from 
the perspective of the police offi cer. In order to implicate some content, 
p, a speaker must intend that his audience will recognize p (Grice 1989: 
39). So to whom is the content of the implicature in this example really 
less clear?
I would like to propose that what is going on in the bribing case is 
that the speaker has formulated the utterance with two audiences in 
mind (as in the case Grice proposed). The implicature is clear to one 
audience and unclear to another audience.
The second audience the speaker has in mind does not have to be 
present. The speaker will think this person could later hear about their 
utterance and judge their behavior on the basis of it. If the second audi-
ence never in fact hears of the utterance this does not change what it 
meant (recall Neale on ‘determination’).
With this in mind, let us revisit the game-theoretic framework 
Pinker presents to explain the police bribe case.
Honest Offi  cer Dishonest Offi  cer
Don’t bribe Ticket Ticket
Bribe Arrest for bribe Pay bribe; go free
Implicate bribe Ticket Pay bribe; go free
Recall that one assumption of Pinker’s framework is that in order for a 
speaker to implicate the bribe along the lines of the third row, it must 
be the case that the speaker “knows that the offi cer can work through 
the implicature and recognize it as an intended bribe, and he also 
knows that the offi cer knows that he couldn’t make a bribery charge 
stick in court because the ambiguous wording would prevent a prosecu-
tor from proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”8 (Pinker 2007a: 
394). There is no reason to make this assumption.
This case can instead be understood fi rst in terms of two different 
types of interpreters in the offi cers: 1) those offi cers who will under-
stand the implicature, and 2) those offi cers who will not. This is not 
equivalent to the difference Pinker details between honest offi cers and 
8 Although Pinker later contradicts himself and writes that for certain bribes 
that are more heavily veiled there is “some risk that they might go over the head of 
a bribable offi cer” (Pinker 2007a: 395).
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dishonest offi cers. For Pinker the difference between honest and dishon-
est offi cers is spelled out in terms of the offi cer’s response to the implica-
ture, not whether or not he or she understand an implicature was made. 
There is a gap between whether some person understands an implica-
ture was made and how they act on the basis of this recognition. This is 
an important gap to recognize and the following framework will do so.
If we understand the offi cers as two different classes of interpret-
ers that constitute two different audiences, we can see this case as a 
close parallel to the one Grice presents, where the offi cers who do not 
understand an implicature was made are akin to the child, in the sense 
that they understand the utterance in terms of its literal meaning, 
and those who do understand an implicature was made are akin to the 
adults, in the sense that they understand the utterance in terms of its 
implicated meaning.
This means that we must revise Pinker’s game theory framework to 
refl ect these two audiences.9
Audience 1. Savvy Police Interpreter—will understand the implicature
Honest Offi  cer Dishonest Offi  cer
Don’t bribe Ticket Ticket
Bribe Arrest for bribe Pay bribe; go free
Implicate bribe Arrest for bribe Pay bribe; go free
Audience 2. Naïve Police Interpreter—will not understand the implicature
Honest Offi  cer Dishonest Offi  cer
Don’t bribe Ticket Ticket
Bribe Arrest for bribe Pay bribe; go free
Implicate bribe Ticket Ticket
Veiled speech has the added benefi t that some honest offi cers who 
might have otherwise arrested a driver for bribery will not understand 
that a bribe was made. At the same time, this framing highlights one 
of the risks of using veiled speech with an audience one is unfamiliar 
with: there is a possibility the intended audience will not work it out—
in this case, losing out on offi cers who would take the bribe if they could 
work out one was offered.
A negotiation between these two possible audiences leads to (part 
of) the benefi t of having some bribe be more or less explicit. A more ex-
plicit bribe increases a) the chances an offi cer who would take the bribe 
will work out one is being made and b) the chances an offi cer who will 
arrest for a bribe will work out one is being made. A more veiled bribe 
increases a) the chances an offi cer who would take the bribe will not 
9 Matrices modeled after Farrell and Gibbons (1989).
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work out one is being made and b) the chances an offi cer who will arrest 
for a bribe will not work out one is being made.10
I am not arguing that this is what Pinker really meant but that 
what is really going on in the sorts of cases he discusses is best modeled 
with this framework that allows for more nuance, and makes clear the 
ways in which his account can be brought into conjunction with what 
Grice says about multiple audiences.
To most fully model the circumstances of the example we must also 
consider another audience. Should the driver be arrested, another au-
dience becomes relevant: the jury. We should also consider the utter-
ance with respect to the second set of audiences. In doing so, we sepa-
rate two issues: 1) whether or not the police offi cer will understand the 
implicature, and 2) (bringing in a new potential audience) whether or 
not a jury will understand the implicature. If the speaker does formu-
late his utterance with two audiences in mind, as I suggest, this means 
that we must further revise Pinker’s game theoretic framework to re-
fl ect these two audiences.
If it is right that the utterance was formulated with both of these 
pairs of audiences in mind—both 1) a savvy and naïve offi cer, and 2) a 
savvy and naïve jury11—the fi nal game-theoretic framework would be a 
combination of two matrices.
10 Let me provide a brief note on how this utterance could plausibly be received 
as something other than a bribe. When I presented this talk at the 2015 Language 
and Linguistics Conference in Dubrovnik, along with many of the other papers in 
this volume, there was an interesting discussion stemming from a professor who 
lives and works in Mexico struggling to understand how this utterance could be 
considered anything other than a bribe. In fact, in the U.S., where Pinker lives and 
works, the rules for how speeding tickets are paid vary by state. So, this example 
makes more sense in its setting in America where, because of the variance in rules 
by state, it is likely that there may be genuine ignorance or confusion on the part 
of some drivers about what the rules are in that state and where bribing is less 
common than in many other countries (Walton 2013).
11 I realize these names “naïve” and “savvy” do not fully capture what is going 
on here but have decided to stick with them because they do capture some piece—
although in perhaps too dramatic a fashion. “Literal” and “read-between-the-lines” 
could be another way of spelling it out. Also, this is not meant to be a fi xed feature 
of the agent per se, but the agent faced with some particular utterance. Some police 
offi cer might be very good a recognizing a bribe in his native language, but more 
likely to interpret literally in his second language, for example.
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On the left, calculation of what the best move is in this step depends 
fi rst on the values given in each of the cells and the ratio of honest and 
dishonest police offi cers. This is calculated within each matrix. Then 
the matrices are weighted with respect to the odds of a police offi cer 
being savvy or naïve. On the right, calculation of what the best move 
is in this step is done within the grid and depends on the ratio of savvy 
to naïve jurors.
The honesty or dishonesty of the police offi cer comes from the deci-
sion to put the utterance up for evaluation by the second audience. This 
feature is independent of this audience’s ability to work out implic-
tatures. A similar thing is going on in Pinker’s maître d’ case. In each 
case, who the relevant audiences are depends on who the speaker has 
in mind, which is a function of who the speaker believes may respond 
in a way that has costs or benefi ts for him/her.
Takeaway
We can now, once again, return to Pinker’s argument.
1. Veiled speech is ineffi cient.
2. Because veiled speech is ineffi cient it is uncooperative.
3. Grice only considers communication that occurs in contexts 
of pure cooperation, as given by his “Cooperative Principle”.
4. Therefore, veiled speech cannot be accounted for by Grice, 
and we need Pinker instead.
I have argued here that premise 2 is false, and argued in previous sec-
tions that premise 3 is false. This means that Pinker’s argument is not 
sound and that we do not reach his intended conclusion.
Despite the fl aws in Pinker’s argument, the fi rst premise in his ar-
gument—which I have not argued against and which points to the inef-
fi ciency of indirect speech as an important puzzle—is true, and is an 
important point that has been overlooked in much literature on implica-
ture. Implicature is costly: it is diffi cult for a speaker to produce, diffi cult 
for a hearer to interpret, and there is increased risk that the message 
will go wrong along the way (Kruger 2005). Because of these potential 
First Audience 1. Savvy Police Interpreter
Honest Offi  cer Dishonest Offi  cer
Don’t bribe Ticket Ticket
Bribe Arrested Pay bribe
Implicate bribe Arrested Pay bribe
First Audience 2. Naïve Police Interpreter
Honest Offi  cer Dishonest Offi  cer
Don’t bribe Ticket Ticket
Bribe Arrested Pay bribe
Implicate bribe Ticket Ticket
Second Audience (this framework 
only applies if arrested for bribe):
Savvy Jury Naïve Jury
Bribe Felony Felony
Implicate Felony Let Off 
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costs to the use of indirect speech we ought to seek an understanding 
of why and when speakers choose to use implicature rather than state 
content literally. Pinker’s idea of using a game theoretic framework 
to model the costs and benefi ts of certain utterance types—although 
fl awed in the details of its execution and especially in his understanding 
of Grice—is a very helpful way to consider this question. The multiple 
audience framework I have presented here could be utilized to help us 
understand why implicature is used in a number of cases.12
The multiple audience framework provides one piece of the puzzle 
of when we use implicature. There are many other pieces of the puz-
zle and reasons for using implicature in addition to those discussed 
here.13 It is a puzzle that anyone who makes use of Grice’s framework 
of conversational implicature or other similar accounts of veiled speech 
should be interested in solving. Even if there is a quibble about my 
treatment of Pinker's specifi c cases here I hope to have succeeding in 
making the more general point against the general contours of Pinker’s 
arguments against Grice.
Up to this point I have sought to stress the ways that Pinker mischar-
acterizes Grice on cooperation. I also presented a new game theoretic 
framework that deals with apparent uncooperative obscurity in terms 
of two audiences, and allows us to better explain Pinker’s bribing case. 
My ultimate goal, however, is a more general one about the aims of the 
Gricean project, the tools at hand to help us meet those aims, and over-
looked but worthy questions relevant to that project.
a. Deniability
I will now consider some objections and addendums to the proposal as 
presented thus far. Someone responding to the ideas put forth in this 
paper may object that this analysis is unnecessary because the benefi ts 
afforded by using veiled speech can be accounted for by saying that the 
veiled speech is used so that the implicated content is deniable. Pinker, 
himself, appeals to a notion of “plausible deniability” to explain the 
bribing cases.14 However, if we are to say that some content is deniable, 
we must be clear about what is demanded by deniability. Four points 
of needed clarifi cation emerge.
12 I have in mind Grice’s tea party and letter of recommendation cases.
13 For example, one other piece of the puzzle might be in our judgments that 
those who express criticism with sarcasm rather than with literal speech are seen as 
being more in control (Dews, Kaplan, and Winner 1995; Pinker 2007a: 379).
14 I seem to be at odds here, too, with Pinker, who writes that one who has uttered 
“They never seem to have enough salt shakers at this restaurant” can deny having 
asked for the salt, and that someone hearing such an utterance could simply ignore 
it without being rude. He also writes that for this reason, ostensibly following Brown 
and Levinson (1987), utterances such as “It’s too dark to read” as a request for the 
lights to be turned on are more polite than direct requests, again dubious claim. It 
seems such a speaker, who assumes it is the duty of the hearer to quell all concerns, 
speaking to anyone other than a servant, would be quite rude and unpleasant.
 M. Johnson, Cooperation with Multiple Audiences 223
First, in saying that some claim is deniable, what are we saying 
about the likelihood that this act of denying succeeds? Surely this objec-
tion rests on deniability being something stronger than just that some 
claim could be denied—for any claim whatever could, in principle, be 
denied. Consider the following utterances made by the same person:
1) I’m from Athens.
2) Oh—but I don’t mean I’m from Athens.
Or, drawing from a recent political news event,
3) “Perhaps there are two Donald Trumps.”
4) “I don’t think there’s two Donald Trumps. I think there’s 
one Donald Trump.” (Nguyen 2016)
Such a series of remarks would confuse and require clarifi cation by 
the hearer. It seems not that the speaker has succeeded in denying the 
content of the fi rst utterance but simply said two things that are con-
tradictory. Deniability, then, seems to demand some reasonable chance 
of success of convincing an interlocutor that the speaker did not mean 
the denied content.
Second, we have a further point of clarifi cation demanded of anyone 
who relies on a notion of deniability. That is, he or she must take a 
stance on whether succeeding in denying some utterance is an act of 1) 
getting the hearer to believe that the asserted proposition is not true, 
2) getting the hearer to believe that the speaker did not mean the as-
serted content (although it may be true), or 3) Both 1) and 2)—that is, 
an act of getting a hearer to believe both that the asserted proposition 
is not true, and that the speaker did not mean the asserted content. 
Third, at the same time, we would want to isolate deniability from 
clarifi cation. Consider the following modifi cation on two of the utter-
ances above.
5) I’m from Athens.
6) Oh—but I don’t mean I’m from Athens, Greece; I’m from 
Athens, Georgia. 
In this case we do not have a true case of deniability because in this 
instance the speaker (assuming he had a genuine intention to speak 
about Athens, Georgia in the fi rst utterance) is not denying the propo-
sition he meant in the fi rst utterance. What he was likely doing in this 
case is realizing after he made the utterance that he had been misun-
derstood, and wanted to rectify this by making a more explicit utter-
ance. Such a case would result from a speaker not accurately assessing 
how he would be interpreted. Thus, we have a further distinction be-
tween deniability applying to 1) what the speaker meant or 2) what the 
hearer took the speaker to mean, or 3) what the speaker thought (non-
factive) the hearer took her to mean. Any appeal to deniability would 
require resolution of what the required target of the act of denying is.
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Fourth, in saying that some content is deniable the further question 
also arises of to whom the content is to be deniable, especially if we are 
considering utterances formulated with multiple authors in mind.
b. Cancellability
Such discussions of deniability can be somewhat clarifi ed by appealing 
to Grice’s notion of cancellability. For Grice, if some content was impli-
cated, rather than stated literally, the speaker should be able to cancel 
the implicature (39). Consider the following example:
7) Mr. X has wonderful handwriting.
8) Of course, I am not saying he is no good at philosophy.
In this example there is a reasonable chance that the speaker would suc-
ceed in cancelling the content of utterance 7—or at least a better chance 
than if he had stated the implicated content literally in the fi rst utterance.
Grice’s notion of cancellability, can, at times appear to be at odds 
with his spelling out of implicatures. For, in order for some speaker s to 
have formed a genuine meaning-intention with respect to some content 
p and some audience a by uttering some utterance r, s must expect that 
a will work out p on the basis of r. If this is right, why would s then 
think he could subsequently get a to believe ~p?
One way around this apparent problem with cancellability is to say 
that what is going on here is not that s get a to believe ~p, but that s 
get a second audience, a*, to believe ~p. We could say, then, that the 
cancellability of some content p is a feature of the ability to get a* to be-
lieve ~p after hearing r. We see, then, that deniability—as understood 
in terms of Grice’s notion of cancellability—is not a true alternative to 
the multiple audience framework but a concept that is already present 
in the Gricean framework and could be brought together with the mul-
tiple audience framework to be fully fl eshed out.
c. The Demands of the Multiple Audience Framework
Some object to Grice because his account of speaker meaning is thought 
to be too psychologically demanding. Jennifer Hornsby, for example, 
writes the following of Grice’s theory: “I think that this ought to seem 
ludicrous. Real people regularly get things across with their utteranc-
es; but real people do not regularly possess, still less act upon, inten-
tions of this sort...notice that an enormous amount would be demanded 
of hearers, as well as speakers, if such complex intentions really were 
needed to say things” (Hornsby 2000: 95). The framework I present 
here is an especially complex application of the Gricean framework. 
What, then, of this objection to Grice, which seems doubled here? 
There are many behaviors we engage in that seem dizzyingly com-
plex when spelled out, such as athletes catching a baseball, musicians 
playing a saxophone solo, or fi refi ghters deciding when to run out of a 
burning building (Kahnemann 2013). The complexity of these behav-
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iors themselves is not enough to insist that we do not really engage in 
them, but further reasons to be in awe of what the human mind can do. 
With regard to the multiple audience framework, there are un-
doubtedly many cases where, because of the potential costs and ben-
efi ts, speakers do successfully navigate the waters of multiple audi-
ences. The “coloring” example above is one such instance. A starting 
place of the objection—the belief that formulating some meaning inten-
tion with respect to multiple audiences is highly demanding—is right, 
and this is why it routinely goes wrong. However, the psychological 
demandingness appealed to in this proposal is not enough on its own 
to reject it.
Applying the Multiple 
Audience Framework to Political Speech
Failure to recognize that some utterance may be put up for interpre-
tation by a second audience can lead to disastrous consequences. For 
my concluding example, I will draw on a real-world case that is an 
instance of such a disaster. This case makes it clear that my suggestion 
that a speaker could or should formulate an utterance while keeping 
in mind the possible interpretations of a second audience is not some-
thing cooked up for hypothetical examples, but something we routinely 
engage in.
Mitt Romney lost to Barack Obama in the 2012 presidential elec-
tion. The blow that may have cost him the presidency resulted from 
failing to take into account the interpretation a second audience would 
make of one of his utterances. The gaffe occurred at a Boca Raton fund-
raiser, which would have been fi lled with very right-leaning donors to 
Romney from whom he would like to solicit as much money as possi-
ble.15 With this audience it is most advantageous to use strong rhetoric. 
Romney told the crowd he was unconcerned with the 47 percent of the 
electorate who supported Obama (that is, “those people”, “victims” who 
take no “personal responsibility”) (Leibovich 2014).
However, unbeknownst to Romney, someone in the audience fi lmed 
his utterance and posted it online. Thus, this utterance that fi rst took 
place “behind closed doors” became available for interpretation by a 
second audience, the general public, who were outraged by what Rom-
ney had said. A headline in Mother Jones, which broke the story, read, 
“Secret Video: Romney Tells Millionaire Donors What He REALLY 
Thinks of Obama. When he doesn’t know a camera’s rolling, the GOP 
candidate shows his disdain for half of America” (Corn 2012). After this 
footage came out, Romney’s poll numbers slipped irreparably.
15 Note here the two audiences are made up of two types of interpreters, not two 
individuals. The multiple audience framework can be applied either to individual 
audiences, or audiences grouped according to some similar interpretive tendencies.
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On September 30, 2014, nearly two years after he lost the election, 
Romney did an interview with the New York Times in which he re-
fl ected on why he lost. 
‘I was talking to one of my political advisers,’ Romney continued, ‘and I said: 
‘If I had to do this again, I’d insist that you literally had a camera on me at 
all times’ — essentially employing his own tracker, as opposition research-
ers call them. ‘I want to be reminded that this is not off the cuff.’ This, 
as he saw it, was what got him in trouble at that Boca Raton fund-raiser. 
(Leibovich 2014)
He continued, “My mistake was that I was speaking in a way that 
refl ected back to the man,” Romney said. “If I had been able to see 
the camera, I would have remembered that I was talking to the whole 
world, not just the man” (Leibovich 2014). As he later recognized, Rom-
ney would been better off if he had formulated his utterance by weigh-
ing the costs and benefi ts with respect to his multiple audiences. He 
felt he had erred in not doing so in the fi rst place.
This tension is common in political discourse. Politicians are con-
stantly negotiating the line between energizing supporters and mak-
ing comments that will appeal to—or at least not greatly offend—the 
general public (Economist 2005; Fear 2007; Haney López 2014; Nguyen 
2016). The proposed game theoretic framework of cooperation with mul-
tiple audiences could be used to model such negotiations. The framework 
presented here has wide applicability to a number of types of discourse.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued against some of the claims made by Steven 
Pinker in his book The Stuff of Thought and in subsequent papers. In 
particular, I argued that Pinker is misguided in a number of objec-
tions he makes to the theories of philosopher H. P. Grice. In arguing 
for Grice I developed positive notions of the sort of cooperation Grice 
demands and explained how cases of obscure language can be coopera-
tive within Grice’s framework. Attention to the role multiple audiences 
play in leading to intentional, cooperative obscurity led me to return to 
some cases Pinker presented against Grice within Grice’s treatment of 
multiple audiences. I concluded by addressing some possible objections 
to this proposal and by suggesting how the multiple audiences frame-
work I presented could be applied to cases of political discourse. 
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